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The neglected e¤ects of demand characteristics on the
sustainability of collusion
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Abstract
According to standard IO models, the parameters that characterize market demand
(intercept, slope, and elasticity) and technology (the level of symmetric marginal costs) do
not play any role in dening the sustainability of collusive behaviors in Bertrand oligopolies.
This paper modies this counterintuitive result by showing that all of the aforementioned
factors do indeed matter when prices are assumed to be discrete rather than continuous.
The sign of these e¤ects is clear. Their magnitude varies greatly; i.e., in some cases, it is
totally negligible, while in others, it becomes extremely relevant.
JEL Classication : L13, L41.
Keywords : Collusion, Market demand, Discrete prices, Bertrand supergames.
1 Introduction
Collusion is protable for participating rms but pernicious for the economy as a whole. In
fact, collusive behaviors not only increase prices but may also undermine the incentives for
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innovation and reduce the quality and the variety of products available on the market. Due to
the importance of these negative e¤ects, the analysis of collusion has always attracted a great
deal of attention. Additionally, important links have been established between the vast body
of theoretical literature and the daily activity of antitrust authorities.1
One key aspect in the study of collusion is the identication of the factors that can facilitate
or hinder sustainability of non-competitive behaviors over time. From a theoretical point of
view, an analysis of such an issue is common in the context of Bertrand supergames (as intro-
duced in Friedman, 1971) where rms repeatedly compete and potentially collude on prices. In
these models, collusion appears to be sustainable whenever rms prefer the stream of collusive
prots rather than the short terms gains that would follow a deviation from the cartel.
In other words, collusive agreements hold if rms are patient and discount the future at a
rate that is not lower than a certain threshold. Previous results show that many factors can
modify this threshold and thus facilitate or hinder the sustainability of collusive behaviors (for
a review, see Ivaldi et al., 2003 or Motta, 2004). Some of these factors are related to the supply
side of the market. For instance, a high level of concentration in the industry, symmetry of the
colluding rms, and product homogeneity facilitate the survival of a cartel. Yet, other factors
are related to the demand side of the market. For example, a positive demand shock hinders
collusion as it increases the incentives to deviate and conquer the entire market (Rotemberg and
Saloner, 1986). In contrast, collusion is more easily sustainable if demand growth is prolonged
because the incentives to start a price war decrease when collusive prots increase over time
(Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991).2
These evolutions of market demand are usually modeled exogenously, i.e., by introducing
a multiplicative factor that proportionally inates or deates the demand function from the
1For a recent and non-technical review of these issues see Porter (2005).
2Note that demand growth can also trigger future entry, which in turn hampers the sustainability of collusive
agreements. See Vasconcelos (2008) for a detailed analysis of these two countervailing e¤ects in a Cournot
framework.
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outside. In fact, the alternative strategy of modifying the internal parameters of the function
would produce no e¤ects whatsoever. This is a standard result of these models; i.e., the para-
meters that dene the shape of market demand (the slope, the intercept, and the elasticity) and
the level of symmetric marginal costs3 while obviously a¤ecting the protability of collusion
do not play any role in dening its sustainability. Therefore, collusive behaviors appear to be
equally sustainable in two hypothetical markets where, everything else being equal, the demand
function in market A is k times steeper than the demand function in market B or the marginal
costs in market A are, say, 5% of the costs that rms in market B face.
Yet, this counterintuitive result is driven by the assumption that prices are continuous.
With such an assumption, all of the aforementioned parameters similarly a¤ect both the long
term collusive prots and the short term gains from undercutting rivals. As a consequence,
they disappear from the constraint that denes the incentives that sustain collusion. However,
this paper shows that this result does not hold (i.e., demand characteristics and the level of
symmetric costs do have an e¤ect on the sustainability of collusion) if prices are assumed to be
discrete rather than continuous.
The possibility of discrete prices is often mentioned in the discussion of Bertrand models,
but the implications of such an assumption are usually studied under the conditions of perfect
competition, i.e., as prices approach the lower bound of the admissible price interval. For
instance, a typical textbook exercise may ask students to study how the standard Bertrand
equilibrium (i.e., price equals marginal cost and zero prots) changes when prices are discrete
and the condition p = c is not feasible.4 On the other hand, no studies have considered the
implications of discrete prices in a non-competitive environment, i.e., when prices stabilize at
3We stress that this statement refers to symmetric marginal costs. Cost asymmetries have been shown to
a¤ect the sustainability of collusion even in the standard framework (Rothschild, 1999).
4The solution as follows: rms set the lowest possible price above marginal cost, prots are positive, and
deviations are strictly costly. The same logic applies to the theoretical and experimental studies about price
oors (see, for instance, Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000 and Dufwenberg et al., 2007).
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a much higher level with respect to marginal cost. This paper investigates this issue.
Still, before moving to a proper analysis of the model, we must briey discuss a few reasons
that justify the assumption of discrete prices. First of all, prices are indeed discrete in reality
due to the minimum unit of measurement used in determining prices (e.g., one cent for goods
priced in Dollars or Euros). However, the actual minimum monetary unit is often wider than
that. In some markets (e.g., the nancial sector, regulated markets, and some kinds of auctions),
a larger monetary unit can be legally enforced as the minimum. In others, social conventions
aimed at reducing transaction costs can a¤ect the minimum price di¤erence; therefore, houses
are traded in thousands of dollars, cars in hundreds, and nightly hotel stays in dollars.
Moreover, price competition appears to work through considerable price jumps even in
markets where search costs should be negligible. For instance, Baye et al. (2004) showed that
the di¤erence between the two lowest prices for homogeneous electronic products sold over
the Internet through a price comparison site ranges between 3.5% and 22%. Finally, the last
evidence that points in the direction of discrete prices is implicitly rooted in the Bertrand model
itself. The model is built on the assumption that a rm that undercuts its rivals conquers the
entire market. However, for this to be true, the deviating rms price must indeed be di¤erent
from the price set by the rivals. According to economic and psychological literature about nite
sensibility, just perceptible di¤erences, and the various heuristics that consumers adopt, this
di¤erence must be su¢ ciently large to be noticed and appreciated.5
In summary, this paper studies a Bertrand supergame of price competition and nds that
the parameters that dene market demand and the level of symmetric marginal costs do indeed
a¤ect the sustainability of collusion when prices are assumed to be discrete rather than contin-
uous. The analysis shows that the direction of these e¤ects is clear but their importance varies
5As an example, Basu (2006) studied a Bertrand oligopoly in which the consumers could rationally ignore the
last (i.e., the right-most) digits of prices because the cost of processing this information outweighs the savings
that would follow from a fully informed decision.
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greatly, i.e., in some situations, it is totally negligible, while in others, it can be quite relevant
and radically modify the incentives that sustain collusive behaviors.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 introduces
the general framework. A more specic analysis is then undertaken for two di¤erent settings
i.e., the case of a market characterized by linear demand (Section 3) and the case of a market
characterized by constant elasticity demand (Section 4). Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The framework
We consider an oligopoly where N rms produce and sell a homogeneous good. Firms are
perfectly symmetrical with marginal cost c  0, discount rate  2 [0; 1], no xed costs, and
no capacity constraints. Market demand is given by Q(p). Firms compete on prices (Bertrand
competition) such that the individual demand for rm i 2 N is given by:
qi(p) =
8>>><>>>:
Q(p)
1+
P
j

1fpj=pig
 if pi  pj for any j 6= i
0 otherwise
In a one-time interaction, collusion cannot arise because the incentives to undercut rivals
drive prices down to the marginal cost. Still, in an innite repetition of the one-shot game,
rms may prot from setting and maintaining a common price that is higher than the marginal
cost. In what follows, we assume that through tacit or explicit agreements, rms are able to
coordinate a price that maximizes industry prots, namely, the monopoly price pm.6 This price
solves maxp  = (p c)Q(p) and leads to total prots m. Because of symmetry, the per-period
collusive prots for each rm are then given by m = 1Nm.
Collusion is sustainable if no rm has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from pm. For
6More in general it is well known from the Folk theorem (see Friedman, 1971) that collusion can take place
at any price p 2 (c; pm].
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this to be true, the stream of prots that follows a deviation must be smaller than the stream
of collusive prots. Such a condition is formally captured by the following constraint:
m(1 +  + 
2:::)  d + p( + 2:::) (1)
The term d, where d stands for deviation, indicates the one-period prots of a deviating
rm while p, where p stands for punishment, refers to the rms prots once competitors react
to the initial deviation.
A deviating rm slightly undercuts the collusive price pm. In the standard analysis with
continuous prices, the size of this undercut is assumed to be negligible ( ' 0) such that the
deviator is basically able to fully realize the monopoly prots (d = m). In this paper, due to
the reasons mentioned in the introduction, the minimal price undercut is assumed to be small
but strictly positive ( > 0).7 This implies d < m. For what concerns p, we let rms
adopt trigger strategies that punish deviations in the harshest possible way (see, for instance,
Porter, 1983). More precisely, rms react to a deviation by reverting to the one-shot Nash
equilibrium such that p = c and p = 0 in any future period. Using this result and the fact
that
P1
t=0 
t = 11  , the constraint (1) can be solved for , resulting in the following:
   = 1  m
d
= 1  1
N
m
d
(2)
According to this expression, collusion is sustainable if the rmsdiscount rate is not smaller
than a certain threshold dened by . In other words, rms must be su¢ ciently patient and
put adequate weight on future collusive prots rather than on short term gains that stem from
breaking the cartel.
7Technically speaking, the assumption of discrete prices implies that the demand function is also discrete. We
claim that for small  the price grid is dense enough such that the actual demand function can be smoothed into
a well-behaved continuous function. As such, in what follows we keep using ordinary di¤erentiation techniques
and we implicitly assume that the optimal solution pm is feasible, i.e., it belongs to the price grid.
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3 Discrete prices with linear demand
Assume that market demand is captured by the linear function Q(p) = a  bp with both a and
b positive. Individual demand for rm i is given by:
qi(p) =
8>>><>>>:
(a bpi)
1+
P
j

1fpj=pig
 if pi  pj for any j 6= i
0 otherwise
The collusive price and quantity are pm = a+bc2b and Qm =
a bc
2 such that each rm realizes
per-period prots of m = 1N
(a bc)2
4b . If prices are discrete, a rm that deviates from the cartel
sets pd = a+bc2b    which leads to quantity qd = a b(c 2)2 and prots d = (a bc)
2 4b22
4b .
Notice that a necessary condition for a rm to consider the possibility of deviating is that
pd > c. This is veried if and only if  < a bc2b , which we assume from now on.
By substituting d and m = Nm in the incentive constraint (2), one obtains that collusion
is sustainable if:
   = 1  1
N
(a  bc)2
(a  bc)2   4b22 (3)
This expression clearly shows two related results. First, if  = 0 (continuous prices), the
constraint simplies to the standard one
 
   = 1  1N

and the characteristics of market
demand (the parameters a and b) and technology (the parameter c) do not inuence the sus-
tainability of collusion. Second, with  > 0, a mismatch occurs between the numerator and
the denominator of the ratio; collusive prots and short term gains from deviations di¤er and
do not cancel out any more. This implies that changes in a, b, or c impact the sustainability of
the cartel because they change , i.e., the critical discount rate below which collusion breaks
In general, notice that the mismatch between the numerator and the denominator is in-
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creasing in . Therefore, the higher is  the lower is  and non-competitive agreements are
more easily sustainable. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. A large  moves
the price set by a deviating rm away from the monopoly price. This implies that the prots of
a deviator are substantially lower than the stream of collusive prots. It follows that rms are
willing to break the cartel only if they are very impatient (low ). At the same time, a large
 brings the price set by the deviating rm near to the competitive price p = c. As such, and
conditional on a deviation taking place, consumer surplus is increasing in .8
To sum up, a large price tick make deviations from a cartel less attractive for rms but
more benecial for consumers. Nevertheless, our main interest is to study how condition (3) is
a¤ected by changes in the values of a, b, or c when the price tick is small. In what follows we
assume a  that is on the order of 1-2% of the monopoly price.
3.1 Marginal e¤ects and their magnitude
Starting from the constraint dened by (3), computing the marginal e¤ects that the parameters
a (i.e., the vertical intercept of the demand function), b (i.e., the slope of the demand function)
and c (i.e., the level of symmetric marginal costs) have on  is easy. These are as follows:
@
@a
=
1
N
8b22 (a  bc)
(a  bc)2   4b22
2 > 0 (4)
@
@b
=   1
N
8ab2 (a  bc)
(a  bc)2   4b22
2 < 0 (5)
8Formally, consumer surplus at the collusive equilibrium is given by csm = 18b (a  bc)2. On the contrary,
if a rm deviates to pd then the surplus becomes csd =
1
4b
(a+ 2b  bc)   1
2
a+ b  1
2
bc

. The di¤erence
csd   csm = 12 (a+ b  bc) is positive and increasing in .
8
@
@c
=   1
N
8b32 (a  bc)
(a  bc)2   4b22
2 < 0 (6)
The signs of these marginal e¤ects are clear given that all the terms of the ratios are
positive. In particular, (a  bc) > 0 given that p > c and thus, (a  bc) > (a  bp) = D(p) >
0. Therefore, an increase in a (a market expansion) increases  and makes collusion more
di¢ cult to sustain.9 Alternatively, one could say that, everything else being equal, collusion
is marginally less sustainable in larger markets. On the other hand, positive shocks to b or c
decrease , thereby facilitating collusion.
In relation to the parameter b, notice that in the equation for the inverse demand curve (i.e.,
P (q) =    q with  = ab and  = 1b ), b inuences both the vertical intercept and the slope.
In a standard (q; p) diagram, an increase in b not only lowers the vertical intercept but also
makes the demand curve atter. In order to disentangle the possibly conicting contributions
of these two e¤ects, we plug the parameters of the inverse demand (b = 1 and a = b =

 ) in
(3), and we study how changes in  a¤ect the new constraint.
   = 1  1
N


   c
2


   c
2
  422
= 1  1
N
(  c)2
(  c)2   42 (7)
The parameter  cancels out and does not appear in (7). Therefore the e¤ects of b on 
work through the changes that b causes in the intercept  and not on the slope .10 In a (q; p)
diagram, a lower b implies a higher vertical intercept, i.e., a larger demand for any given price.
As in the case of the parameter a, a market expansion makes collusion less sustainable.11
9Thinking in terms of the inverse demand function (standard quantity-price diagram) we have that P (q) =
 + q with  = a
b
and  = 1
b
. Obviously an increase in a implies a positive demand shock also under this
formulation.
10Alternatively, equation (5) can be formulated as @

@b
=   @
@a
where  = a
b
and @

@a
is as in (4). This
expression again shows that the e¤ects of b on  are channeled through the changes that b causes on .
11This result is in line with the classical contribution by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Still notice that in
our case the e¤ects on  are triggered by endogenous variations of the demand and not by an exogenous shock.
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The magnitude of the e¤ects of variations in a, b, and c on the degree of sustainability of
collusion varies greatly. A common pattern is that these e¤ects are small and possibly negligible
for a vast range of the domain. Yet, for certain congurations of the parameters, these e¤ects
can be huge. This is due to the fact that the three marginal e¤ects (4), (5), and (6) display
a vertical asymptote that is implicitly dened by the condition 2b = a   bc. This condition
identies the upper bound of the set of admissible parameters. In fact we already saw that the
problem under study is meaningful if and only if pd > c, i.e., if and only if 2b < a  bc. In the
neighborhood of this bound, small variations in the parameters can have major impacts on the
sustainability of a cartel.
Consider the following examples that focus on the e¤ects of b on .12 Figure 1.a depicts 
as dened in (3) as a function of b 2 (0; 10) when N = 2, a = 1, c = 0, and  = 0:01. Figure
1.b refers instead to the case with N = 2, a = 1, c = 0:3, and  = 0:01. Therefore, the only
di¤erence between the two duopolies is that in the second case marginal costs are positive.
2 4 6 8 10
0.48
0.49
0.50
Fig. 1.a: The e¤ects of b on  for
c = 0.
0 1 2 3
0.0
0.5
1.0
Fig. 1.b: The e¤ects of b on  for
c = 0:3.
In the rst scenario, the discontinuity that characterizes constraint (3) arises at b = a2+c =
50. Therefore, the e¤ects of b on  are limited. In the second situation, the discontinuity
arises at b = 3:125, and small variations of b in the neighborhood of this asymptote can have
12Analogous examples can be easily constructed for what concerns the e¤ects of a or c.
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a dramatic impact on . Consider for instance two hypothetical markets that are dened by
N = 2, a = 1, c = 0:3, and  = 0:01 and that only di¤er in the level of the parameter b. In
particular, b = 1 in market A, and b = 3 in market B. With continuous prices, these di¤erences
in the demand curve would not inuence the incentives to maintain a cartel. Therefore, in
both markets, collusion would be sustainable for any   0:5. Our analysis shows instead that
the situation is radically di¤erent when prices are assumed to be discrete. More precisely, by
plugging the actual parameters in (3), we nd that collusion is much more easily sustainable in
market B (  0:219) rather than in market A (  0:4996).
4 Discrete prices with constant elasticity demand
The elasticity of market demand is often mentioned as a factor that may a¤ect the sustainability
of collusion. Nevertheless, the formal analysis of its e¤ects remains a bit vague at least for
the concerns within the framework of Bertrand competition.13 Scholars have indicated that
elasticity and the protability of collusion are inversely related (see Ivaldi et al., 2003 or Motta,
2004).14 From this perspective, elasticity surely has an indirect e¤ect on cartel stability. In
fact, low elasticity makes collusion more protable such that rms are more likely to try to
implement and maintain non-competitive behaviors. Nevertheless, the standard analysis does
not nd any direct e¤ect from elasticity on the sustainability of collusion. The reason again lies
in the fact that under the assumption of continuous prices the characteristics of the demand
function do not a¤ect the critical discount factor above which collusive agreements become
sustainable.
In this section, we study the role of demand elasticity when prices are discrete. An ideal
13For the case of Cournot oligopolies, Collie (2004) relies on numerical simulations to show that high elasticity
makes collusion more easily sustainable.
14 In fact, as it is made explicit by the formulation of the Lerner index, the optimal collusive price (i.e., the
monopoly price) is negatively related with the elasticity of market demand.
11
framework for analyzing such an issue is provided by demand functions that are characterized
by a constant elasticity. The general form for such a function is given by Q(p) = ap  where
 is the parameter that captures elasticity. For the sake of tractability, in what follows we
set a = 1. As before, rms are assumed to be perfectly symmetric with marginal cost c > 0,
discount rate , no xed costs, and no capacity constraints. Competition on prices is such that
generic rm i faces the following demand function:
qi(p) =
8>>><>>>:
p 
1+
P
j

1fpj=pig
 if pi  pj for any j 6= i
0 otherwise
The collusive monopoly price is given by pm =
c
 1 which implies total quantity Qm =
 1
c

. It follows that each colluding rm realizes per period prots of m = 1N

 1
c
 1
.
At the opposite, a deviating rm sets the price pd =
c
 1    that leads to quantity qd =
c
 1  
 
and one-o¤ prots d =
(c+ )
( 1)
1
( 1 1 (+c ))
 . Again, we impose the con-
dition pd > c which is fullled by  < c+ . According to the incentive constraint (2), collusion
is then sustainable if the following condition holds:
   = 1  1
N
(   1)

1
 1 ( + c  )

c+   

1
c
(   1)
 1
(8)
This is quite a complicated function (notice the discontinuity at  = c+ ) and its rst
derivative with respect to  is too cumbersome to be discussed. In order to have a feeling for
the sign and the magnitude of the e¤ects of  on  we thus rely on a numerical example. Figure
2 reports the case with N = 2, c = 0:1,  = 0:01 and  2 (1; 11).
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2 4 6 8 10
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 2: The e¤ects of  on .
The graph shows that  is initially a strictly decreasing function of  such that collusion
becomes more easily sustainable as elasticity increases (in absolute value). Then, an area exists
in which the actual  would be negative such that it is constrained to  = 0, thereby making
collusion always sustainable.
The nding that the sustainability of collusion increases with the elasticity of demand is
consistent with the numerical results that Collie (2004) provides for what concerns Cournot
oligopolies. At rst sight, such a result may seem surprising. In fact, one may imagine that a
rm that operates in a more elastic market has higher incentives to deviate as, given any price
tick , the rm would conquer a larger market share. Nevertheless, such an argument does
not apply in our Bertrand framework with homogeneous goods. In fact, Bertrand competition
implies that a deviating rm conquers all the market no matter the elasticity of demand.
Moreover, the absence of substitute goods prevents consumers to divert their demand to other
markets.
On the contrary, we agree with Collie (2004) and we think that the positive relation between
the sustainability of collusion and the elasticity of demand is triggered by the e¤ects that
elasticity has on the price-cost margin. More precisely, a higher elasticity leads to a lower
monopoly price and thus to a lower margin over marginal costs. This in turn implies that the
13
one-o¤ prots stemming from a deviation are limited as a deviating rm must set a price that
is even closer to marginal costs and thus exploit an even lower margin. Therefore, only a very
impatient rm (low ) would break the cartel.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the sustainability of collusion in Bertrand supergames under the assump-
tion of discrete prices rather than continuous prices. In particular, the analysis highlighted
the e¤ects that previously neglected factors, like the characteristics of market demand and the
symmetric level of marginal costs, may create in terms of shaping the incentives that sustain a
cartel.
Notice that some of the results within this paper could be tested against the data. For in-
stance, the model implies that the degree of sustainability of collusive behaviors is an increasing
function of the price tick . For European countries, an important exogenous variation of 
was caused by the introduction of the Euro in January 2002. For example,  increased by a
factor of around 6.5 for goods previously priced in French Francs, while it increased by a factor
of almost 20 for goods priced in Italian Liras. In markets characterized by high volumes and
low unitary price (e.g., some raw materials), these variations may have had an actual impact
on the sustainability of non competitive behaviors.
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